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INTRODUCTION   
In Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (in liq) v HNA Group Co Ltd [2020] UKSC 34, [2020] WLR(D) 488, 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court faced the vexing and politically fraught question of the 
admissibility of unproven but credible allegations of torture at the hands of Chinese police. This 
fascinating case required applying common law evidentiary rules with reference to background 
evidence relating to Chinese criminal law and procedure. The Supreme Court overruled the Court 
of Appeal on the relevance of unproven torture allegations, finding that although torture had not 
been proved, the torture allegations could be taken into account when assessing the reliability and 
weight of other evidence.  
 
FACTS 
The case involved an otherwise mundane international business dispute arising from a shipping 
charter contract. The charterparty in question was concluded in 2008 between Shagang Shipping 
Co Ltd (Shagang) and Grand China Shipping Co Ltd (Grand China), with Grand China’s parent 
company, HNA Group Co Ltd (HNA), as guarantor. When Grand China defaulted, Shagang 
commenced action in the Commercial Court against HNA under its guarantee. HNA filed its 
defence to Shagang’s claim in November 2013. 
 
Importantly, HNA is based in Haikou, the capital of Hainan province. Between November 2013 
and February 2014, the Haikou Public Security Bureau (PSB, a type of police department) detained 
and questioned three people on bribery charges: Mr Jia, son of Grand China’s CEO; and Mr Xu 
and Mr Shen, both Shagang employees at the time. In February 2014, HNA requested information 
from the PSB on the investigations, and the PSB sent a letter to HNA in reply summarising 
confessions purportedly made by the three men. HNA then amended its defence to allege that the 
charterparty had been procured by bribes paid on behalf of Shagang to senior employees of Grand 
China.  
 
Shagang subsequently amended its reply in the Commercial Court proceedings to plead an 
allegation that the confessions of bribery relied upon by HNA had been obtained by torture and 
were therefore inadmissible. By the time of trial, in early 2016, the only fact in issue was whether 
the charterparty had been procured by bribery; unless HNA succeeded in this defence, Shagang 
was entitled to judgment on its claim under the guarantee in a sum of USD 68,641,712.  
 
Allegations of Bribery 
 
Mr Jia and Mr Xu were college acquaintances. According to the Haikou PSB interrogation records, 
Xu was questioned on 23 January 2014. The records showed that during questioning, Xu confessed 
to being asked by Mr Shen to use his relationship with Jia to cause Jia’s father to charter the vessel 
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from Shagang as soon as possible, and that to that end, Xu delivered RMB 100,000 to Jia. The 
interrogation records from Jia’s questioning on 23 January 2014 showed Jia confessing to 
receiving RMB 150,000 from Xu as a bribe, and a subsequent instalment of a further RMB 150,000 
shortly after the charterparty was concluded. The records from 24 January 2014 showed that Xu 
amended his confession to describe paying a bribe of RMB 300,000 in two instalments. The 
records from 4 March 2014 showed that Xu was asked about this change, and answered that he 
had initially given a lower amount to escape punishment, but “being educated by the police 
officers, I realised the mistakes I made”. The PSB records also showed that Mr Shen confessed on 
16 February 2014 to facilitating a bribe of RMB 300,000. 
 
As the UK Supreme Court later noted, it is not known what caused the Haikou police officers to 
initially detain Xu and Jia on bribery charges; however, as noted by experts giving evidence at the 
UK trial, it is not unknown for local PSBs in China to interfere in commercial disputes in favour 
of local economic interests. HNA’s only oral witness in the Commercial Court, Mr Wu, accepted 
that HNA had no evidence that Shagang had bribed anyone in relation to the charterparty, and 
never acquired any evidence other than the confessions. There were no convincing commercial 
reasons as to why a bribe would have been paid in the relevant market, in which Shagang held the 
dominant bargaining position. On the evidence provided by the PSB, the individuals had confessed 
of their own initiative, in the absence of any evidence to implicate them. For example, the record 
of Mr Xu’s first confession showed that after being asked about his personal details and told that 
he was under suspicion of bribery, he was asked: 
 
Question: Do you have any criminal action, please explain? 
 
Answer: Yes, I have criminal action of bribery. 
 
Question: Please describe in detail your behaviour of bribery. 
 
Answer: Sure. In June 2008 … [The confession then follows] 
 
Allegations of Torture 
 
In May 2014, Shagang formally complained to the Haikou People’s Procuratorate (the supervising 
department of the PSB) alleging that HNA had used the PSB to manufacture false charges, and 
that Xu and Shen’s confessions had been procured by torture (a seemingly cursory Procuratorate 
investigation found the allegations were unsupported). Xu, who had been under arrest since his 
interrogation in January, was subsequently interviewed by his lawyer, Mr Guo. Guo’s interview 
notes record details of Xu’s allegations of torture, including beatings, “pouring water into him” 
and burning with a cigarette butt. Guo later received an unsigned document, purportedly from Jia’s 
wife, detailing Jia’s allegations of torture at the hands of the PSB, including sleep deprivation, 
hooding and waterboarding. This statement also reported that before his confession, a PSB senior 
official told Jia that “our HNA Group just wants to solve a problem … you need not worry, just 
co-operate and write down a confession, and strive to return home for Chinese New Year”. 
 
In December 2014, Xu, still in police custody, was again interviewed by lawyers. According to 
the meeting notes, Xu said that he had been interrogated again at the end of November, and was 
told if he admitted to bribery, he would be released shortly, but that if he denied the charges, the 
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sentence would be lengthy. Xu subsequently pleaded guilty, but maintained his innocence to his 
lawyers throughout. He was sentenced in November 2015 and released based on time served (one 
year and eight months). 
 
COMMERCIAL COURT DECISION 
In the UK Commercial Court, three witnesses gave oral evidence: Mr Guo; Shagang’s general 
manager; and Mr Wu, HNA’s general manager of audit and legal affairs. Each party also relied on 
expert evidence of Chinese criminal law and procedure, which showed that in a high proportion 
of criminal cases in China (as many as 95% according to Shagang’s expert), the suspect confesses; 
that it is normal for suspects to plead guilty; and that innocent verdicts are very rare (for context, 
The New York Times puts China’s 2019 conviction rate at 99.9%). The experts also agreed that 
although torture is illegal in China, instances of the police using torture continue to be reported.  
 
In a judgment which the Supreme Court later criticised for its brevity, Robin Knowles J found that 
on the balance of probabilities, and despite the confessions evidence, there was no bribery by Mr 
Xu ([2016] EWHC 1103 (Comm)). The Judge was careful to acknowledge the decision of the 
Chinese court finding Mr Xu guilty of bribery, generously allowing that the latter’s finding could 
be attributed to it not having evidence of Mr Xu’s denials before it. Based on these denials, and a 
number of other factors, the Judge deftly contextualised the purported confessions so as to cast 
doubt on their persuasiveness, without referencing or deciding on the torture allegations. These 
other factors included the following: lack of legal representation during interrogation; lack of 
opportunity to test the PSB officers; lack of convincing commercial reasons as to why a bribe 
would have been paid in the relevant market; lack of evidence of withdrawal of funds; and that the 
prospect of leniency was a credible reason for making false confessions. This latter point fell to be 
considered with reference to background evidence regarding the extraordinarily high conviction 
rates in the Chinese courts; as the Supreme Court later noted, in the Chinese context, “the 
attractions of leniency are clear if allegations are believed to be highly likely to lead to conviction 
in any event and to much greater punishment if they are denied” (at [81]).  
 
Before moving to the torture allegations, the Judge expressly stated that these reasons alone would 
have caused him to reach the conclusion that there was no bribe. He went on to say that torture 
could not be ruled out as a reason for the confessions, a factor which he said “further reduces the 
confidence that I can put in the confessions” (at [102]). However, he declined to reach a definitive 
conclusion on whether there was torture. Here the Judge again expressed deference to the Chinese 
authorities, noting that confining his views in this way was “in the interests of leaving proper room 
for investigation in China by the appropriate authorities” (at [105]). HNA was ordered to pay 
damages in the agreed principal sum. 
 
APPELLATE DECISIONS 
Following an oral hearing, HNA was granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, 
contending that having accepted that the confession evidence was admissible, the Judge’s 
conclusion that the charterparty had not been procured by bribery was unsustainable. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal ([2018] EWCA Civ 1732, [2019] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 150), criticising the 
Judge on four grounds. These included (1) that the Judge ought to have decided the issue of torture 
first, and thus failed to address issues in the logical order; and (2) that the Judge fell into legal error 
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by failing to exclude as irrelevant his “lingering doubt” as to whether the confessions were 
procured by torture. On appeal to the Supreme Court, these criticisms were addressed as explored 
below; the Court of Appeal was overruled and judgment for Shagang restored.  
 
Logical Order: Leaving Torture to Last 
 
The Court of Appeal considered that the issue of torture was the sole basis on which the 
admissibility of the confessions was resisted, and thus determining whether or not torture had taken 
place was properly the Judge’s first task. If the Judge found that torture had not been proved, the 
Judge should have found the confessions admissible as hearsay, and gone on to determine the 
weight to be given to that hearsay evidence. Only then could the Judge decide whether there had 
been bribery. 
 
The Supreme Court accepted that where there is an issue as to whether important hearsay evidence 
is admissible, it would generally be logical to decide on admissibility first before considering 
weight. However, it found this is not a mandatory approach. The Supreme Court interpreted the 
Judge’s approach (conclusion on confessions preceding and not contingent on torture evidence 
analysis) as a de bene esse admission of the confession evidence. In other words, the Judge 
provisionally admitted the confession evidence, but went on to find that notwithstanding the 
confessions, there was no bribery. As a result, the question of the admissibility of the confessions, 
which turned on whether or not they were obtained by torture, did not have to be decided. 
 
The longstanding practice of provisionally admitting evidence (which in New Zealand is governed 
by s 14 of the Evidence Act 2006) can serve as a useful way to bypass complex and time-
consuming admissibility questions. Evidence can be conditionally accepted on the assumption that 
later evidence will definitively establish its admissibility. However, if it turns out that the 
provisionally admitted evidence is not critical to the decision to be reached, and its conditional 
admission did not create any unfair prejudice in the proceeding, the evidence can effectively be 
ignored as irrelevant to the matter at hand (and even if a specific finding of irrelevance is not made 
by the trial judge). This is essentially what took place in the Commercial Court, and this approach 
was approved by the UK Supreme Court. 
 
The utility of provisional admittance in the Shagang Shipping case is obvious: where admissibility 
depended not on a run-of-the-mill issue such as witness availability, but on the question of whether 
a claim of police torture in China had been made out, the de bene esse approach allowed the Judge 
to avoid reaching a conclusion on torture. Whether this was the appropriate response to the 
allegations is open to debate. By punting on the issue of torture, arguably the Commercial Court 
evaded a moral responsibility to confront those grave allegations more directly. On the other hand, 
foregrounding the torture allegations, as the Court of Appeal seemed to want the Judge to do, 
would not only have been politically fraught (the Supreme Court was no doubt understating this 
when it described the issue as “a sensitive one” (at [60])), but may have had ramifications for the 
parties and Chinese citizens involved. It is worth noting here that three weeks after Shagang 
amended its reply to allege torture, HNA wrote to the Haikou PSB accusing a number of people, 
including two solicitors acting for Shagang, of fabricating evidence and asking the PSB to “handle 
the case legally and punish the criminals severely”. Reading between the lines, both the 
Commercial Court judge and the UK Supreme Court were well and truly alert to the complexity 
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of interests at stake. Likewise, Shagang did not state its case as turning on the torture allegations 
in the first instance; this was mirrored in the equally tactical Commercial Court judgment, which 
walked a fine line between acknowledging the gravity of the allegations and expressing deference 
to China’s investigative authority. 
 
Relevance of Unproven Torture Allegations 
 
Although the Judge did not find torture had been proven, he also stated that torture could not be 
ruled out as a reason for the confessions. This possibility provided an additional ground for his 
conclusion that the confession evidence could not be relied on. The Court of Appeal criticised this 
as an error of law, finding that as torture had not been proven, the possibility of torture was an 
“irrelevant matter” which should not have “infected” his findings on the confessions/bribery issue. 
 
To this end, HNA argued and the Court of Appeal accepted that the law operates a binary system, 
in which facts in issue must be decided as having either happened or not. To quote Baroness Hale 
in Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] AC 11 (at [32]), a judge “is not allowed to sit on the 
fence. He has to find for one side or the other.” Applying the binary principle to the case, the Court 
of Appeal considered that by not finding on the balance of probabilities that the confessions had 
been obtained by torture, the Judge had, in law, found that there was no torture. As such, he was 
bound to disregard the possibility of torture as a factor impacting the reliability of the confessions. 
 
The Supreme Court gave a short and a long answer to this argument. The short answer was that 
the absence of a finding on torture did not amount to a finding that torture had not been proved. 
The Commercial Court judge had clearly stated that he was not expressing a definitive conclusion 
on whether torture had been proved. 
 
The long answer was that even if the Judge had concluded that torture had not been proved on the 
balance of probabilities, this would not preclude a finding that torture was a real possibility which 
affected the reliability of the confessions. Addressing the binary argument, the Court noted that a 
binary system operates where a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (such as, for example, where 
admissibility depends on proving a certain fact)—that is, for facts in issue at trial. However, if a 
particular fact has not been proved, this does not mean the fact must be treated as not having 
happened for all other purposes; it may still be relevant for assessing the weight of other evidence.  
 
Here, it was not proven on the balance of probabilities that the confessions were the result of 
torture; as such, the confessions were admissible. However, this admissibility did not require 
ignoring a serious possibility that the torture allegations were true when assessing the weight of 
the confessions. Rather, the court found that there “is no legal or logical reason for treating such 
evidence as inadmissible and good reason to treat it as admissible given its obvious relevance” (at 
[108]). 
 
That is certainly true as a matter of evidence law—for example, if a New Zealand judge were to 
find that certain facts raised by a party were not sufficiently persuasive to render hearsay evidence 
inadmissible under the threshold reliability test for hearsay (s 18, Evidence Act 2006), that party 
would still be able to relitigate those facts to the jury as a matter of weighing up the hearsay 
evidence. Likewise, in Shagang Shipping, even if the Commercial Court judge had determined 
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that the torture allegations had not been proved, this would not have “immunised” HNA from those 
allegations in the sense of rendering them entirely non-probative/irrelevant for all other purposes 
(I am borrowing the language of Fenemor v R [2011] NZSC 127 here, which  dealt with the 
admissibility of evidence that resulted in an acquittal in a previous criminal proceeding as 
propensity evidence in a subsequent trial, a somewhat analogous situation). 
 
But beyond “legal or logical” reasons, on the facts of the Shagang Shipping case there is at least a 
political argument that supports the Court of Appeal’s proposed approach: admitting the torture 
allegations to help weigh up the confessions, but without having explicitly ruled on those 
allegations, is perhaps too easy of an out, given the gravity of the human rights abuses involved 
and the need to confront those allegations upfront and head-on.  
 
SUMMARY 
In reinstating the original judgment, the UK Supreme Court endorsed a relatively deferent and 
politically sensitive approach to a vexing issue. As the Court noted, torture is illegal in China and 
various reforms have been put in place “seeking to eradicate a perceived problem of the use of 
torture to coerce confessions” (at [33]). However, there are ongoing reports of torture being used 
by police—for example, in August of this year, a group of human rights organisations made a 
submission to various United Nations bodies on China’s practice of broadcasting allegedly coerced 
confessions before trial (World Organisation Against Torture Submission to select UN Special 
Procedures on: China’s practice of extracting and broadcasting forced confessions before trial 
(11 August 2020), available at <www.omct.org/files/2020/08/26016/submissionchina.pdf>). 
Faced with credible claims, and an inability to hear from any witness with first-hand knowledge 
of the alleged events, the Judge acknowledged both his inability to reach a firm conclusion and the 
need to leave proper room for China to investigate. Torture is formally illegal in China, and torture 
prevention has been a law reform focus for the central Party-State authorities for many years; the 
investigation of these allegations is in their hands. 
